

GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL ORDER

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Abstract

The world is facing a dangerous power vacuum which may last for decades. This vacuum is developing because Europe and the USA are currently in a phase of relative decline while China, India and Brazil are claiming international standing without being able to fill this role. A close look reveals several significant changes in global politics and the world economy: China, Russia, India and Brazil are global actors and are gaining relative strength. Together with other regional powers (e.g. Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia) they are influencing global energy, climate, security, trade, and development policies. At the same time, however, they are too weak because they – despite partly strong economic growth – are unable to eradicate poverty in their own countries and an extremely imbalanced distribution of income and wealth prevails resulting in massive social problems. Their ability to effectively lead on a global level is limited as they do not yet provide enough global public goods (security, monetary arrangements, development aid).

O mundo enfrenta um perigoso vácuo de poder que pode durar décadas. Este deriva de a Europa e os Estados Unidos estarem atualmente numa fase de declínio relativo enquanto a China, a Índia e o Brasil reivindicam prestígio internacional, sem terem capacidade para preencher esse papel. Uma análise mais detalhada revela mudanças significativas na política e economia mundiais: a China, a Rússia, a Índia e o Brasil são atores globais e estão a ganhar força relativa, influenciando, juntamente com outros atores regionais – como a Turquia, a África do Sul ou a Indonésia – a energia, o clima, a segurança, o comércio e as políticas de desenvolvimento. Simultaneamente, porém, são demasiado fracos, porque apesar do seu forte crescimento económico, não são capazes de erradicar a pobreza nos seus próprios países e têm uma distribuição muito desequilibrada da riqueza, resultando em grandes problemas sociais. A sua capacidade para liderar em termos globais é limitada, uma vez que ainda não fornecem suficientes bens públicos globais (como a segurança, os acordos monetários, a ajuda ao desenvolvimento).

Keywords: global order, power shifts, geopolitics, global economy, BRICS

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RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS

The rise and decline of nations has always played a significant role in the more historically minded assessment of international relations. When the hegemony of a major power or world power is on the wane, the entire world order becomes unhinged, as exemplified by the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire (Kennedy 1987). Even though military and political circumstances usually play a decisive role, the decreasing cohesive strength of widely accepted value systems and established economic relations are factors which should not be underestimated.

In an era marked by accelerated globalisation the decisive elements for maintaining a leading position or reaching a leading position after a transition period are the mastering of economic and political tasks in the broadest sense and, the ability to provide global public goods.

The decline of the USA as a world power

Despite the vehemence applied by American politicians in the defence of the USA's, to some extent, imperial behaviour and the affirmation of their leadership role, it is apparent that the United States has lost its status as a hegemonial power (OECD 2012). Joseph Nye (2010) claims that the USA is experiencing a relative decline, not an absolute decline. Even though the USA clearly constitutes the strongest economic and military power, it is nevertheless struggling with severe weaknesses resulting from low economic growth and the prolonged decline of the processing industry—particularly in the field of innovative technological products. Additionally, gross investment declined and technological progress has stagnated due to low educational standards. Industrial productivity and the increase of total factor productivity, which indicate technological progress, are growing far too sluggishly to maintain an internationally competitive leading position. The USA's distinct loss of momentum has been ongoing for years leading to an overall decline in driving economic force and appeal, and resulting in a loss of global acceptance. Surveys

and regression analyses have shown that the size of the population, industrial value added and the ability to export are central criteria for leading powers, including the USA. In recent years, the significance of the USA has been marked by a decrease in these fields.

American political scientists Joseph Nye and Anne-Marie Slaughter take a different perspective. According to Nye (2010), leadership ability does not depend exclusively on military and economic power, but also on *soft power* and ultimately on being able to establish and use diplomatic, military, economic and scientific networks (Slaughter 2009). As far as these factors are concerned, the USA has suffered a loss of cohesive power while that of other countries has increased. The soft concept has made its way into American foreign policy under President Obama. Despite the political assertions of the US-government, its current *soft power* no longer suffices for creating peace in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel (neither, however, does its hard power), for defeating global poverty or for combating protectionism, to mention just a few aspects. Furthermore, the USA's (and also the EU's) ability to provide global public goods by means of their *hard and soft power* has decreased. This observation can be applied to the making of security, to the combat of terrorism, prevention of state disintegration, to the combating of organized crime, and the spread of piracy and mafia networks.

The EU's lack of dynamism

Europe remains the world's largest economic area with an approximate 20% share in the global GNP. The EU's per capita incomes and average productivities are far higher than those of China, India, Brazil and Russia, and also those countries belonging to the next 11 (Columbia, Indonesia, Pakistan, etc). In the last three decades, having started at a high level, the EU's growth rates are on average lower than those of the emerging powers. This indicates a lack of dynamism which gives rise to a creeping loss of economic significance. The following three aspects illustrate why the EU is not well-equipped for the future:ⁱ

1. The Lisbon strategy of 2000 stated that by 2010 Europe was to become the most competitive and most dynamic knowledge-based economy of the world. However, the implementation of this aim has failed due to single-minded actions of some nations, a lack of implementation mechanisms and incoherent strategies. Nowadays declining productivities, weak growth, structural unemployment, lack of flexibility in the employment market, demographic decline and insufficient immigration are characteristic for the EU. These developments are supplemented by a very high deficit, social, economic and political crises in several countries (e.g. Greece, Italy) and in the European Economic Area, which remain unsolved.

2. The European Union lacks hard and soft power. In comparison with the USA, the EU is relatively weak in the areas of the military, diplomacy and foreign policy as well as business-network policies and civil society's activities, and is even unable to bring its political and economic weight to bear in the neighbouring East European countries and Mediterranean area. But the case of Ukraine shows that the EU is gaining more weight, trying to find peaceful solutions. The united activities of the EU countries made it clear that Europeans take leadership. On the other side the EU is not an important player in the various conflicts in the Middle East and in North Africa. In 20 years it was unable to establish a coherent policy for Turkey and its migration policy is highly controversial. Numerous other examples for a waning EU could be enumerated.

3. The final and most important argument is the fact that the EU is largely preoccupied with itself. The distinct navel-gazing gives the impression that European integration is a prerequisite for peace and stability in Europe itself, and that it is also a growth machine for development and prosperity or perhaps a democratising and stabilising power for the new member states. Yet in the period of globalisation it no longer enjoys the former respect of others as a model. Eurocentricity prevents Europeans from playing a global role. The predominant inward gaze makes them substantially less appealing in the eyes of their neighbours (Mediterranean states) and also less appealing for those African states strongly connected to Europe and in search of new partners

(China, India, Brazil etc.). In even more distant countries, Europe displays economic presence (for example, Germany as an investor and exporter) but has no significant political influence due to its inability in taking on a "non-European perspective" (Mayer 2008). But debates are going on how to improve Europe's weight in international organisations, in multilateral institutions, global governance activities, and also in bilateral strategic partnership agreements (see Renard, Biscop 2012).

THE RISE OF CHINA, INDIA AND BRAZIL AS EMERGING POWERS

In the last decade, the global balance of power has changed significantly; a fundamental shift towards a multipolar world has been taking place (Bénassy-Quéré/Pisani-Ferry 2011). Even so, an increase in multilateralism can only be recognised in parts, as bilateral activities are taking shape between hitherto weakly linked states in parallel. Freshly burgeoning national protectionism and economic patriotism is replacing global governance. At any rate it is becoming more difficult to conclude multilateral agreements (climate agreements, world trade regulations, nuclear disarmament et al.).

An overwhelming and unstoppable dynamism is predominantly shifting towards Asia and generating a significant increase of South-South cooperation. Many governments are turning away from the USA and the EU towards the emerging powers, new centres with global influence, in particular China, India and Brazil; other states such as Turkey, South Africa, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia also play a role. Above average growth characteristically prevails in these states (Kappel 2011; Kappel 2014).

Based on empirical comparisons and regression analyses we define emerging powers as follows: *The emerging power is an economic power in the region, which has influence and possesses the capacity for regional and global action. It has a relatively large population and covers a relatively large area. The emerging power realizes high economic growth, above the regional average, over a longer period of time and thus provides a growing market for the region. It plays a dominant role in trade within the*

*region. It develops industrially and technologically; the state expenditures for R&D increase and come close, or overtake, the level in the OECD world. The emerging power has regionally- and globally-active businesses, which are increasing in strength. These provide competition for businesses from the OECD world within the regional–global value chains and increasingly dominate the regional markets. The emerging power increasingly provides public goods in the form of a stable currency and reliable monetary policy. It takes on an increasing role in global governance and the governance of the region, particularly with respect to regional cooperation agreements.*ⁱⁱ

Export growth: China and India have been growing at an average of 10% for the last 30 years (the EU and the USA with less than 6%, both, however, starting off at a very high level). The average growth of the GNP of most emerging powers is significantly higher than that of the EU or the USA. This, however, does not apply to Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Mexico, Nigeria and Iran. At the same time per capita income has also shown above-average growth, however, mostly starting off at a low level. In China and India industrial value added is growing at above-average rates, but Brazil's and South Africa's figures are significantly lower.

The inadvertent economic rise of various emerging powers is the result of a long-term process starting in the 1970s and 1980s, and not just the result of growth sustained in the last five to ten years. In his book "The Awakening Giants" Pranab Bardhan gives a detailed account of how China and India had set the course thirty years ago by modernising agricultural industry, expanding research and conducting market reforms.

The world economy is no longer led by the OECD. The dimensions have clearly shifted in a way beneficial to emerging powers, and especially to some leading Asian countries (Korea, Japan, China, India, and Indonesia). Their rise, particularly of China and India, had already been predicted in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the last years it has become reality (Shambaugh 2013; OECD 2010).

Brazil, China and India do not only exert influence on a regional but also on a global level, owing to the fact that the G20's importance is soon to exceed that of the G7. The dynamism is becoming particularly

visible, as the global and regional actors are not only increasingly playing a role in shaping global governance (e.g. climate, energy, world currency, WTO, IMF) but also as their appeal in the region has increased due to their strong economic growth and the fact that they will eventually have public goods at their disposal. An increase of intra-regional trade and direct investments on their part contributes to more profound exchange and integration.

It is apparent that emerging powers are catching up and that this process will also gain more drive due to American and European investors wishing to be present in the growing markets with trade, investments and participation in research (in order to bind scientists, engineers and a highly qualified workforce).

The unsolved problems of the emerging powers

Their own political and economic overestimation and weak "soft power", however, prove to be obstacles. India, for example, describes itself as a global power, although it is unable to take on real global responsibility or create reliable conditions in the region, for example, for defence and security policies in South Asia and in ASEAN (Sisodia/Datta 2008). India's currency is not stable, the country is on a weak footing as far as the global economy is concerned and its infrastructure is poorly developed. The success in combating poverty is at best meagre. So far, India's "soft-power competence" is small.

China is an exponent of a newly forming world order. The growing self-confidence in the field of foreign policy is a result of its economic success story. So far, its regional activities and its activities in the international forums are not sufficiently directed at global governance and global public goods. China's relations to some neighbour states are of a more hegemonial nature. Despite close economic cooperation there seems to be a higher degree of conflict than cooperation with India (Cashmere, Tibet, Pakistan). China does not yet have enough *soft power* and has not accrued sufficient esteem. Thus it cannot yet assume a global leadership role. Therefore some authors classify China as "partial power" (Shambaugh 2013). Additionally, the number of followers is still relatively small and often limited to internationally controversial states such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan and

Nicaragua. Other states, such as Vietnam, turn away from China and to the USA, as China seems to be becoming too powerful.

Brazil is important, but is overrated (Burgess 2013). Brazil is a middle income country, which has gone through a period of crisis (1981-1993), which was followed by a period of moderate growth and limited recovery. Brazil coped well with the financial crises (as China and India), and has taken steps forward to become a global power. Economically the country is in the process of catching up. But GNP growth rates and the industrial value added in the last thirty years were quite low compared to those of China and India. Nevertheless, its global and regional activities (MERCOSUR integration, climate policy) have been conducive to Brazil accruing great esteem in the “global South” and in the G20.

The further rise of the new emerging powers will certainly not be linear due to exceedingly inconsistent internal situations. Economic growth, the size of the population and the size of the country do not automatically entail regional, let alone global, leadership. The requirements are far higher: reliability, trust of the neighbours, *soft power* and provision of public goods for the region and worldwide. Additionally, power is relational, that means there are not just two but several actors aiming for hegemony and some neighbouring states which do not always comply. In the wake of these developments, the transition to multipolarity is quicker than the EU and America would wish. The strategy of integrating Russia and China in cooperative relations in order to eventually return to unipolarity – with the USA as the leading power – has failed due to strongly levelled power relations between the USA, the EU and the emerging powers.

The frequency at which collisions of geostrategic interests and interests concerning energy and economy policies occur is increasing. China demands a multipolar currency order which is to supersede the US-dollar as the leading currency. It is precisely the weakness of the US-dollar concurrent with the simultaneous increase in significance of other currencies which lead to uncertainty and insecurity in the global economy.

Risks caused by the relative rise and decline of nations

The relative rise of Brazil, China and India with the concurrent relative decline of the West is by no means a constellation within which “coerced cosmopolitan solidarisation” will occur. In my view it is simply a shift in global politics and the world economy. The extent to which many countries follow US or EU dominated decisions has reached an all-time low.

In the G20, emerging powers sometimes take positions in diametrical opposition to the ideas of the traditional powers, which is most obvious with regard to climate policy, economic protectionism, global supply of energy and, in particular, values. In this context, it makes no sense to pretend that the increase of wealth also entails the readiness to comply with the West on all issues. The opposite is the case: the un-unified West will have to learn that China, Brazil, India and other states will refuse to be ordered how to conduct economic, political and cultural matters etc., let alone simply adhere to Western values and norms which often display ambiguitiesⁱⁱⁱ (human rights and their application) and endeavours for dominance and exploitation. Indeed emerging powers are aspiring to a new order of global politics; they no longer want to be followers. They are forming new alliances and do not longer want to be taken in tow by the USA, such as Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela, Iran, South Africa, India and Brazil. To a hitherto unprecedented extent, they resent external hegemony. They themselves now try to lead, they clearly attend to their own interests and they do not compromise at all costs (cf. agricultural negotiations, world trade, currency, world health; membership in IMF, WTO and World Bank).

It is obvious what the new emerging powers lack, and the lessons they will probably learn in the near future are plain to see: the ability to lead globally or even just regionally and making global public goods available. They too rarely take global and regional responsibility. Their policies are too unreliable for generating trust in the non-OECD-world, and also in the EU and the USA. The notion that the governments of smaller states would place more trust in the latter would be entirely

incomprehensible, if China, India and Brazil were able to guarantee global security, energy supply, combat of poverty etc. in a joint effort. However, the development has not yet arrived at this situation. So far, the emerging powers have emerged as the new poles in the multipolar economic systems, they are hubs, but predominantly lack soft power.

Nevertheless, the tendency is positive – as the following chapter shows. China, India and Brazil have become more reliable and cooperative in some fields (e.g. issues of world trade, with regard to international technological standards, sustainability and protection of the environment, combat of poverty). However, this does not apply to democracy, international currency policy, combat of terrorism and joint actions against the destabilising policies of states such as Myanmar, North Korea or Iran. They have rejected compromises in climate policy, even though India, China, South Africa and Brazil are among those most severely affected by climate change.

THE EMERGING POWERS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The growing international role of ‘emerging powers’ and their increasing economic weight and material power capabilities have triggered a debate on their role in global governance. The following sections will illustrate the main features of this debate. The article identifies three strategies through which emerging powers have participated in global governance processes over the years (Destradi, Jakobeit 2015). We focus our analysis on the policies of emerging powers in the fields of trade, development banks and climate policy.

Emerging powers have generally been defensive and cautious about the widespread calls for greater participation in global governance. The prevailing defensive posture is mostly underscored by the argument that emerging powers are willing to share ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in the management of global problems. For example, the dominant argument promoted by emerging powers on matters of climate governance is that they still have to focus on their domestic agenda of economic

development, which needs to be balanced with issues of environmental protection. Moreover, they consider established powers not only to have the resources, but also the duty to shoulder the costs of climate protection since they have historically contributed most to climate change. With respect to global trade negotiations, emerging powers have effectively used their rising weight to block decision-making along the lines of obscure ‘green room’ deals at the eleventh hour by the established powers of the North (the US, the EU and Japan).

The BRICS countries have over the years become the most vocal proponents of the notions of sovereignty and non-interference. They have been sceptical of all global-governance initiatives impinging upon the sovereignty of single states, for example on the International Criminal Court and on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), perceived as driven by the narrow self-interest of established powers.

Emerging powers have criticised existing international institutions for not representing the actual division of power in the contemporary world. However, they have not tried to overthrow those institutions and have, instead, demanded reforms (Destradi/Jakobeit 2015). Similarly, emerging powers have pressed for reforms of the Bretton Woods Institutions, and were able to obtain an increase in quota shares in them during the financial crisis. Ultimately, this contributed to reinforcing the legitimacy of existing institutions and of established principles of hierarchy.

Emerging powers have demonstrated an unprecedented readiness to engage and play a constructive role in recent crises, but trying also to establish themselves as veto-players.

Trade policy

Emerging powers and developing countries have traditionally viewed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the international financial institutions, namely the World Bank and the IMF, as pillars of US interest and the much-preached trade liberalisation as a concept of the West (Destradi, Jakobeit 2015; Narlikar 2013).

The WTO as a successor to the GATT was formed in

1994 and raised high hopes. After several failed attempts to revitalise the Doha Round since September 2013, the best hope for the Doha Round was to bring forward minimal deals in order to be able to keep the WTO alive and to move ahead with multilateral rule-making and governance for world trade. The 9th ministerial conference of the WTO in Bali in December 2013 was able to streamline trade, to allow developing countries more options for providing food security, to boost least developed countries' trade and to help development more generally. Along with 45 developing countries, and mainly pitted against the US, India had relentlessly fought to achieve an exemption clause for its National Food Security Act to allow more scope to buy food at administered prices. At the end of the Bali meetings there was a compromise that allowed India to subsidise food within clear limitations and under close monitoring. Without this compromise, there would have been no agreement.

The biggest threat to a global system of standardised trade rules, however, is provided by the ongoing negotiations between the EU and the US on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and among the 12 members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Taken together, the real challenge posed by the TTIP and the TPP is that the 'old powers' are about to alter the rules of the world economy with a different approach, this time based on cross-continental regional integration and with the US as the strategic hub should a merger between the TTIP and the TPP be possible. The likely global effects would be enormous. The TTIP and the TPP are not just about agriculture and goods or the modest initiatives started by the US and the EU in the Doha Round, but about the rules on cross-border investment, competition and procurement policies, intellectual property rights and so on, reviving the aims of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.

Development Bank – The Chinese Challenge

The year 2014 can be noted as the year when serious competition has been built into multilateral development banking, especially for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The new BRICS bank, the *New Development Bank* (Reisen 2013) has been launched at the sixth summit of the

BRICS countries, held in Brazil in July 2014. The bank will have starting capital of US \$50 billion, with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa initially contributing US \$10 billion. End October 2014, more than twenty Asian countries (including India and, a month later, Indonesia) signed as founding members a Memorandum of Understanding to create the Beijing-based *Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank* (AIIB), which specified the authorized capital of the AIIB as US \$ 50 billion, half of which is paid in by China. Both new institutions are intended to concentrate on funding infrastructure projects.

The establishment of BRICS-led multilateral development banks (Reisen 2013) will be beneficial for global development to the extent that it helps close infrastructure financing gaps and that it helps rebalance representation of the non-OECD countries on the multilateral scene that remains very much US-scripted. The new banks may even speed up 'voice reform' in the Bretton-Woods institutions – so far effectively hindered despite all rhetoric by the West. However, their very existence makes that reform now less important than in the past when the established MDBs (World Bank, ADB, AfDB, IDB) were the only important sources of infrastructure finance for many poor countries.

In a broader setting, the establishment of multilateral development banks outside the established Bretton-Woods system can be viewed as *China's shadow global diplomacy* that aims at undermining US-led governance structures established after WWII. Competition is building for the existing Bretton-Woods system.

Another concern is that the establishment of alternative source of multilateral funding will act to weaken the enforcement mechanism of the existing MDBs. They might as well lose their preferred creditor status.

Climate policy

In the field of climate policy, the tensions between emerging and established powers become evident (Destradi, Jakobeit 2015; Never 2012). In Copenhagen, the so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) played a decisive role in the outcome of negotiations. Emerging powers'

representatives reached an agreement together with the United States, while the European Union and smaller developing countries were excluded. This reflects the influence that emerging powers developed in issues of climate governance due to their economic power, their growing emissions and the fact that it is impossible to address this challenge without their cooperation.

Emerging powers are not just acting as veto players in global climate policy. On the contrary, Brazil, India and China were among the driving forces of the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. They managed to induce the industrialised countries to acknowledge responsibility for past pollution, to accept the notion of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' and to agree to transfer technologies to less developed countries.

While they have been reluctant to make binding concessions in multilateral frameworks, emerging powers have displayed an increasing readiness to take voluntary action to address the problem of climate change at the domestic level. Ahead of the Copenhagen conference, emerging powers made unilateral pledges on future emission reductions. China, India, Brazil and South Africa announced concrete reductions by 2020. While these were, of course, only declarations of intent on the part of the emerging powers, their scope should not be underestimated.

As in other policy areas, a proliferation of forums, groupings and actors can be observed in the field of climate governance over the past few years as well. These new dynamics led to the formation of new interest groups and coalitions, which did not necessarily reflect the traditional dichotomy of North vs. South or industrialised vs. developing states. Emerging powers did not form a compact coalition in all issue areas. While India and Brazil cooperated in the BASIC group at Copenhagen, they held quite different positions on the issue of deforestation.

CONCLUSION

As the three cases discussed above illustrate, there is no evidence for the inevitable confrontation between the 'North' and 'South' or the established and emerging powers. If anything, we can demonstrate an astounding resilience on the part of the North, preaching global governance on one hand, while sometimes pursuing very narrow interests unilaterally on the other.

Emerging powers have actively participated in existing international governmental organisations, albeit without weakening their sovereignty or giving in to binding targets and commitments that are not in their clearly expressed interests (Narlikar 2013; Hou, Keane, te Velde 2014). They continue to call for a greater voice in these international institutions and are more sensitive to manipulation or being dealt with on unequal terms. If binding global agreements cannot be reached, they do follow voluntary and unilateral action. And if things do not progress enough with respect to much-needed governance reform in these international institutions, they do not hesitate to set up their own arrangements. This is illustrated by the envisaged creation of the BRICS Development Bank to put pressure on the World Bank.

Due to these developments, the deepening divide between the rich and poor countries and the rising global inequality – to mention a few problems - the world is currently in a fragile imbalance. The cause thereof is not only the relative weakness of the EU and the USA but also the fact that the transforming emerging powers have only partly been able to reliably act globally and regionally. Out of reaction the BRICS have begun the process of establishing their own institutions to existing rival institutions. The vacuum in the provision of global public goods and a regional leadership gap, and global and regional governance gaps are already spreading. The world is drifting apart. Leadership, order, and global and regional governance are no longer guaranteed.

Currently the West is not solving enough global problems. Europe makes many promises, but the incoherence of its foreign policy and security policy weaken its ability to act decisively. Despite NATO, despite strong positions in international

organisations and despite high economic standards the “Club of the West” is increasingly losing its abilities to lead and govern.

In many ways Europe is succumbing to the belief that it can continue without adapting. But the rise and dynamism of the “new” is here. European foreign policy is inhibited. The tendency to act on single state policies illustrates its weakness. In order to avert further decline, the EU must develop coherent European policies for foreign affairs, foreign trade, climate issues, energy, finance, currency, migration, technology, for democratic values and, cooperation with civil society networks. The unified activities reg. Ukraine and solving the problems of debt-stricken EU countries indicate that the EU and its member states try to tackle the problems. It will also have to learn to act and solve global problems with the emerging powers in the context of a mutual (not a unilateral one-sided) discourse on global obligations. This is absolutely essential for the successful reduction of the global and regional governance gaps currently looming.

NOTES

ⁱ There is a debate going on whether the EU is an attractive model and a global actor. Andrew Moravcsik (2010) makes it clear that the EU is a hard and a soft power. The EU’s civilian and military power capabilities have increased: “In many ways Europe is optimally suited to project power in the contemporary global system” (p. 153). Anne-Marie Le Gloannec (2011) emphasizes that the EU is a regional power and her soft power is backed by a formidable economic structure which attracts other countries to merge with it. Others point out inconsistencies of the EU’s presence, capabilities and patterns of behaviour.

ⁱⁱ Many realists evaluate power primarily in terms of military power (offensive realism). This is supplemented by including GDP (economic power and population). Other authors choose economic power, human capital and technological level as economic indicators. Nye (2010) focuses on “soft power” and Slaughter (2009) on “network power”. See Kappel 2011

ⁱⁱⁱ For example, the West’s embarrassing and notorious cooperation with leaders like Mubarak, Gadaffi, Assad, Ben Ali, Bouteflika etc and undemocratic regimes such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China etc. The conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East have made it clear that the European *Realpolitik* supported authoritarian regimes, and neglecting the needs of the people and their fight for democracy. The “Arab revolts” illustrate the vicinity of European leaders with undemocratic power elites in almost all Near East and North African countries, and the failure of European hard and soft power and network politics.

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